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FINAL EXAMINATION
Civil Procedure
Mr. Curtis
I

John Rolfe is a resident and domiciliary of Virginia. On
June 1,1969 1 he purchased an automobile from the Stanley Steamer
Car Agency, a Virginia corporation ,,,hich does business only in
Virginia. In purchasing the vehicle, Rolfe paid $50 down and
signed a contract for the balance of the purchase price obligating
himself to make 12 consecutive monthly payments of $50 each to the
seller. Immediately after completing the purchase, Rolfe called
upon Jerimiah Witless, an authorized agent of the Reckless Insurance Company, who sold Rolfe an automobile liability policy on
behalf of the Reckless Insurance Company. Reckless is incorporated in Virginia, has its principal and sole office in Virginia,
retains agents in Virginia, but has no offices or agents outside
Virginia. However, Reckless Insurance Company does place advertisements in nationally circulated magazines solliciting mail
order applications for life insurance. About sixty percent of
the company's income is derived from the issuance of life insurance policies to non-Virginians.
Two weeks after purchasing the car, Rolfe began a business
trip to New York in the new vehicle. En route he stopped over
in Baltimore, Maryland, where he registered at the Sportsmen
Motel on the evening of June 15, 1969. Reginald Vulture, a
resident of Maryland, heard that Rolfe was in Baltimore and
had recently bought the car from Stanley Steamer. Sometime
earlier Vulture also had bought a car from Stanley Steamer,
and Vulture believed Stanley Steamer had tortiously misrepresented
the condition of the vehicle. On June 16, 1969, Vulture sued
Stanley Steamer in a Haryland State court and obtained a writ
of attachment over the debt owed Stanley Steamer by Rolfe.
The local sheriff, after being unable to locate Rolfe, served process (including the writ) upon Hiss Clark, the resident manager
of the Sportsmen. On the evening of the 16th, as Rolfe was
checking out of the motel Hiss Clark handed him the papers left
by the sheriff. Rolfe read the papers, tore them up, discarded
them, and proceeded to New York. The next day the clerk of
the Haryland court sent notice of Vulture's suit to Stanley
Steamer. Upon receipt of the notice, Stanley Steamer by return
mail sent the following letter to the Maryland court: "Dear
Judge Mansfield, I donit owe Vulture a red cent. This whole
thing is a farce. If I were you, I won't proceed any further with
the matter. James Berry, Vice President, Stanley Steamer Car Agency. 11
After receiving this letter, the Maryland court rendered judgment
against Stanley Steamer for $1,000 and issued an order compelling
Rolfe to send his monthly installment payments to Vulture. Both
Stanley Steamer and Rolfe were notified of the judgment, and both
ignored it.
In the meantime, Rolfe had arrived in New York, but not before
he had been involved in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania in
which Jason Helpless had been seriously injured. Several months
later, after Rolfe had returned to Virginia, Helpless filed suit
in Pennsylvania State court against Rolfe, alleging that the injuries
he sustained in the accident were caused by Rolfe's ne~ligence. and
that those injuries amounted to $120,000. Helpless, hm~ever, did not
attempt to serve Rolfe; rather he named the Reckless Insurance
Company as defendant-garnishee, and served the Pennsylvania Insurance
Commission under a State statute which provided, in pertinent part:
IIAny insurance company doing business in this Commonwealth shall be
deemed to have appointed the Insurance Commission as its arent to

-2receive service of process in any action directly or indirectly arising
out of or related to its insurance business." As required by statute,
the Insurance Commission by mail notified Reckless and Rolfe of the
action. Subsequently, judgment for $60,000, the policy limit, was
rendered against Reckless, which had appeared unsuccessfully in the
action to contest jurisdiction. Reckless thereupon paid $60,000 to
Helpless.
Quite awhile later, but within all applicable statutes of limitation, Vulture filed suit in a Virginia court against Stanley Steamer
and Rolfe to enforce the Maryland judgment. Stanley Steamer and Rolfe
moved to dismiss on the ground that the Maryland decres was a nullity.
Simultaneously Helpless sued Rolfe in another Virginia court
to collect $60,000 for damages arising out of the automobile accident.
Reckless refused to defend Rolfe 'tlTho then impleaded Reckless. Reckless resists the impleader on the ground th~t it discharged its
duties under the policy when it paid the $60,000 judgment. Hhat
dispositions should the Virginia courts make of these two suits?
II

Part 1. Joe Thundercloud, a Mohigan Indian, residing in New York State,
organized a sit-in demonstration directed against the Syracuse, New
York, Elks Club, on July 4, 1971. Joe and several other Nohigans
entered the premises of the Elks Club, sat down in the main lobby, and
refused to leave until the club accepted their applications for membership in the club. They were advised by a representative of the club
that Mob1gans were not eligible for membership and that their applications would not be entertained. When the demonstrators persisted in
their sit-in, the Elks Club had them arrested under a local trespass
statute.
In the course of the July 4 sit-in, Joe had seized a briefcase
owned by Charles Hughes, a Virginia resident who had been a guest of the
Elks Club and had left his briefcase in the lobby while he availed himself of the respite of the restroom. Unfortunately, Hughes had placed a
rare Etruscan statue in his briefcase. Joe had seized the briefcase in
order to use it as a weapon to employ in fighting off the police who had
been called to arrest him. During the arrests, Joe struck police officer, Elmer Fudd, over the head with the briefcase and thereby inflicted
a brain concussion on Fudd and shattered the statue.
Hughes afterward sued Joe for conversion of the vase in a New York
court, alleging that the statue was valued at $15,000. Fudd also joined
in the action, claiming that the personal injuries he suffered at Joe's
hands amounted to $3, 000 . Joe sought to remove both cases to a New York
federal court, claiming, among other things, that his actions ~lTere
privileged under federal civil rights' legislation and that a substantial
federal question was presented. Hughes and Fudd moved to remand the
case to the State court.
How should the federal court rule on the motion?
Part 2. Assume the motion is denied and trial on the merits is had.
After the presentation of evidence, Joe's lawyer asks for the follmlTing
instruction; "If you,rnembers of the jury, find that the defendant had
a right under federal law to be present in the Elks Club on the day in
question, you must find for the defendant." Plaintiff's counsel objects
to the instruction on the ground that under New York tort law, even
where a private privilege is invoked, one who injures another or
another's property must compensate the other.
Should the instruction be given?
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Part 3. Assume that the jury renders verdict in favor of both plainti:fs in the above suit. Thereafter, Joe travels to the Mohigan Annual
Tnbal Reunion in Vermont. ifuile Joe is in Vermont, he is served '''ith
the process of a Vermont court in an action against him brought by the
Elks Club International for trespass ariSing out of the July 4 sit-in.
The Elks Club International was the legal owner of the premises occupied
by the Syracuse chapter. Since Joe was a non-resident of Vermont, Elks
Club International also attached Joe's automobile which he had brought
with him to the reunion. Joe appeared before the Vermont court for the
sole purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over his person
and ~utomobile. The court , however , found that, while personal jurisdict10n over Joe was doubtful, jurisdiction in rem was properly acquired
~er the car. Joe immediately withdrew from the action, did not join
1ssue on the merits, and returned to New York. The Vermont court then
found the car to be worth $500 and gave judgment in that amount for Elks
Club International.
Elks Club International believed it had suffered losses of Sl,500
. in the sit-in and thus instituted a neH trespass suit against Joe in a
New York court. Joe moves to dismiss the action on res judicata grounds
and counterclaims for $500 asserting that the Vermont attachment deprived
him of property without due process since the Vermont court lack~d
~urisdiction.
The Elks Club moves to dismiss the counterclaim on res
judicata grounds.
How should the New York court rule on Joe's motion?
III
Part 1. Dick Macy was seriously injured in an accident in his home on
April 1, 1971. He is taken for treatment to the office of Spiro Spock,
11. D., who determined that a blood transfusion was necessary to save
Macy's life. Spock thereupon transfused blood into l:1acy. Thereafter,
Hacy developed hepatitis, which he believed was transmitted to him in
the transfusion. On Hardl 15. 1972 , Macy filed suit in a Virginia State
court against Spock for damages suffered in contracting hepatitis.
Hacy's complaint, in pertinent part, alleged that Spock sold blood
to him in the scope of Spock's regular business, that the blood so sold
was contaminated with hepatitis, that in selling such blood, Spock
impliedly warranted that the blood was \vholesome and fit for its intended
use, and that as the result of Spock's breach of these implied warranties, Hacy suffered injury.
Spock filed a timely answer in which he (1) asked dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that Virginia law did not treat a transfusion
administered by a licensed physiCian as a sale and that no implied warranties were therefore made, and (2) sought to implead Kutter
Laboratories, a California corporatioThon the theory that he had purchased the blood from Kutter Laboratories and that any claim ariSing out
of the transfusion lay only against Kutter.
Assume in answering this question that Virginia follows the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court on April 2, 1972, ruled that riacy had not stated a claim
under Virginia law for the reason advanced in Spock's answer and dismissed
the action as to Spock. However, the court did allow the impleader and
permitted Macy to amend his complaint to state a claim against Kutter on
a strict liability theory (hereinafter referred to as the third-party
claim). Spack had already. obtained proper service upon Kutter. Immediately after the court took the above. action .. ~acy moved to amend his
complaint to allege that Spock had been negligent in transfusing him
with the infected blood. Spack demurred to the amendment on the ground
that the applicable one year statute of limitations had run.
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Kutter Laboratories lodged
third-party claim.
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The court overruled Kucter Laboratories' objection and Spock's
demurrer. Were these rulings correct?
Part 2.

After its objection was overruled, Kutter Laboratories answered

by admitting it had sold contaminated blood to Spock but moving that no

privity existed between itself and Hacy, and therefore, as a matter of
law, the third-party claim should be dismissed. Spock by affidavit
alleged that there is no known test for determining the presence of
hepatitis in blood and appended to the affidavit sworn statements of
three well-known medical school professors to the same effect. On the
basis of the affidavit, Spock moved for summary judgment on the theory
that there was no basis for finding negligence. Macy replied with his
own affidavit asserting that the existence of a test for hepatitis is a
fact question for the jury and that the truthfulness of the professor's
statements likewise should be left to the jury. Macy asked that the
motion for summary judgment be denied and informed the court that he
intended to cross-examine the professors vigorously at trial. Macy
also moved for summary judgment against Kutter Laboratories on the
ground that it was clear under Virginia law that privity was not
required under the facts alleged in his pleadings.

Haw should the court rule on these motions?

